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The real value of the US dollar has fluctuated 
widely during the global financial crisis and its 
aftermath.  Beginning  in  early  2008  through 
early 2009, the dollar strengthened against most 
currencies  but  weakened  considerably  in  the 
intervening months. We propose a decomposi-
tion of the forces driving the real exchange rate 
into a long run real interest rate component and 
a residual “level” risk premium component. If 
real interest rates in the United States rise rela-
tive to its partners, the value of the dollar should 
strengthen. Likewise, if the level risk premium 
on foreign interest-bearing assets rises, the dol-
lar should also strengthen. We find that little of 
the recent movements in the dollar are directly 
attributable to the real interest component, sug-
gesting that most of the movements are due to 
the residual risk premium component.
There is a large and diverse literature that 
affords a role to real interest differentials and 
to risk premiums in determining the real value 
of a currency. Our approach is almost purely 
definitional. The only assumptions we rely on 
are those of stationarity—of the real exchange 
rate and the US-foreign real interest differen-
tial. Specifically, let qt denote the log of the 
real exchange rate, defined as the foreign con-
sumer price level (converted into dollar terms 
by the nominal exchange rate) divided by the 
US consumer price level. A decrease in qt rep-
resents  a  real  appreciation  of  the  dollar.  As 
well, let   r  t    
 US
    ≡   i  t   
 US   − Et    π  t+1  
 US
    be the ex ante US
real  interest  rate,  where    i  t    
 US
     represents  the 
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nominal interest rate on one-month Eurodollar 
deposits, and Et    π  t+1  
 US
    is expected inflation in the 
United States. Similarly, rt
* ≡ it
* − Et  πt
*
+1 is the 
foreign real interest rate.
We can then define the excess return on for-
eign interest-bearing assets as:
(1)    λt ≡ rt
* −   r  t    
 US
    + Et qt+1 − qt.
The relative foreign to US real return equals the 
difference between foreign and US real interest 
rates, plus the expected real depreciation of the 
dollar, Et qt+1 − qt.
We take the no-bubbles forward solution to 
equation (1) and use the stationarity of the real 
exchange  rate  so  that  the  limit  as  j → ∞  of 
Et qt+j is  
__
  q   , the unconditional mean of qt :
(2)   qt = −Rt − Λt +  
__
  q   ,
  Rt ≡   ∑ 
j=0
     
∞
      Et(  r  t+j   
 US   − r*
t+j ), Λt ≡   ∑ 
j = 0
  
∞
      Et  λt+j  .
In equation (2), we make the mild assumption 
that the present values converge. We call Rt the 
long run real interest differential, Λt the level 
risk premium.
According  to  equation (2),  holding  Λt  con-
stant,  an  increase  in  Rt  implies  a  real  dollar 
appreciation: when the expected sum of all cur-
rent and future US real interest rates rises rela-
tive to the foreign counterpart, the dollar gets 
stronger.
The level risk premium Λt represents the infi-
nite sum of the expected excess return on foreign 
assets for all periods in the future. While typi-
cally the international finance literature uses the 
term “risk premium” to refer to excess returns, 
here we follow the work of Maurice Obstfeld 
and Kenneth Rogoff (2003) to refer to the effect 
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of these risk premiums on the level of the real 
exchange rate. Holding real interest rates con-
stant, a larger λt implies a higher excess return 
on the foreign investment. Holding Rt constant, 
a larger Λt implies the dollar is stronger in real 
terms.
While we call Λt a risk premium, we do not 
necessarily endorse the position that the excess 
return  represents  a  reward  for  bearing  risk. 
Indeed, λt might instead (or as well) capture one 
or more of the following: (i) a liquidity premium, 
if foreign assets were less liquid than US assets; 
(ii) a deviation of the market’s expectation from 
the statistical expectation (Jeffrey A. Frankel and 
Kenneth A. Froot 1987); (iii) sluggish portfolio 
adjustment  (Philippe  Bacchetta  and  Eric  van 
Wincoop forthcoming); (iv) heterogeneous infor-
mation  across  market  participants  (Bacchetta 
and van Wincoop 2006). In sum, while we call 
λt a risk premium and Λt a level risk premium in 
order to have some convenient label, we do not 
take a stand on the economic forces that lead to 
nonzero values of Λt: λt is defined by equation (1) 
irrespective of economic interpretation.
Our goal in this paper is to estimate Rt and 
compute Λt = −(qt −  
__
  q   ) − Rt for six currency 
pairs noted below, and then to examine their 
movements.
I.  Measurement
The monthly currency pairs we study are the 
real value of the dollar relative to the euro (as 
represented by an aggregate of the real value 
of  three  major  eurozone  countries:  Germany, 
France,  and  Italy),  the  UK  pound,  the  Swiss 
franc,  the  Canadian  dollar,  and  the  Japanese 
yen. We also consider the dollar exchange rate 
against an aggregate of these currencies.
1 Our 
nominal  exchange  rates  are  from  the  Federal 
Reserve database, for the last day of the month. 
We use 30-day Eurocurrency deposit rates, end 
of month, as our measure of the nominal inter-
est  rate,  from  Datastream.  Inflation  rates  are 
constructed  from  consumer  price  index  data 
available from the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation  and  Development  (OECD).  Our 
vector  and  regressive  (VAR)  analysis  also 
1 The weights in the aggregate of the seven exchange 
rates as well as for the euro aggregate are determined by 
relative GDP levels.
includes monthly unemployment data from the 
OECD and monthly commodity price inflation, 
calculated from the nonfuel commodity dollar 
price index available from International Finance 
Statistics. We multiply all series by 100.
Estimation  of  Rt  requires  estimates  of 
Et(  r  t+j   
 US   − r*
t+j) ≡ Et(  i  t+j   
 US   −   π  t+j+1  
 US
     − (i*
t+j − π*
t+j+1)) 
for all j ≥ 0. We estimate a five-variable VAR 
for the United States relative to each country (or 
country aggregate in the case of the eurozone 
countries and the seven-country aggregate) that 
includes the US relative to foreign values of the 
nominal interest rate, the inflation rate, the real 
exchange rate, and the unemployment rate, as 
well as the dollar commodity inflation rate. Our 
VAR includes three lags of each variable.
We include the relative unemployment rates 
in the two countries as a simple measure of the 
relative output gaps. This variable may be help-
ful  in  forecasting  future  inflation,  because  a 
Phillips curve relates inflation rates to the output 
gap. In addition, interest rates set by monetary 
policymakers might respond to the unemploy-
ment rate. For a similar reason, we include com-
modity inflation. Inflation in the dollar price of 
commodities might help forecast relative infla-
tion especially because commodity prices are 
forward looking and respond to inflation news. 
We do not, however, take a structural stand on 
what forces drive our measures of the real inter-
est rates, though it is not implausible to surmise 
that  monetary  policy—either  anticipated  or 
unanticipated—has some substantial influence 
on those rates.
The  estimation  period  is  October  1979  to 
July 2007. The starting date is chosen because 
many  commentators  have  claimed  that  the 
Volcker era represented a break in US mone-
tary policy, so that there may be a break point 
in  the  data-generating  process  for  nominal 
interest rates and inflation. We chose to base 
the coefficient estimates on data only through 
July 2007 because we are concerned that the 
dramatic  fluctuations  in  the  economic  vari-
ables in the last two years may have an undue 
influence on our coefficient estimates. With the 
coefficient estimates in hand, we use standard 
present value VAR calculations to get estimates 
of Rt monthly through October 2009 (using the 
usual, rather than out of sample, formulas even 
for data after July 2007). We then compute Λt 
= −qt − Rt. (Here and in the remainder of the 
paper, we ignore sample means.)MAy 2010 564 AEA PAPERS ANd PROCEEdINGS
Table 1 reports some statistical properties of 
these estimated variables. For each country, the 
diagonal elements are the standard deviations of 
qt, Rt, and Λt, and the off-diagonal elements are 
the correlations.
From Table 1, we note that Λt is more vola-
tile than Rt. In two cases, Japan and the United 
Kingdom,  in  which  Λt  and  Rt  are  negatively 
correlated, we find that Λt is even more volatile 
than the real exchange rate. In all cases, Λt and 
qt are highly negatively correlated, with all of 
the correlation coefficients being larger than 0.9 
in absolute value.
The fact that the standard deviation of Λt is 
almost as large as the standard deviation of qt, 
and the fact that Λt and qt are highly negatively 
correlated,  might  tempt  one  to  conclude  that 
we can attribute almost all movements in qt to 
movements in the level risk premium. But this 
is misleading for two reasons. The first—which 
we ignore in the rest of the discussion—is that 
Λt impounds any discrepancy between our VAR 
estimate of Rt and the analogue computed using 
market expectations. The second is that Table 
1 does not represent an orthogonal decomposi-
tion of the volatility of the real exchange rate. In 
many cases, Rt and Λt are correlated. In some 
cases (Canada and the eurozone) the correlation 
is positive, while for the United Kingdom it is 
strongly negative. The correlation between the 
long term real interest rate and the real exchange 
rate is negative for most of the currency pairs 
(the exceptions being the United Kingdom and, 
weakly, Japan). Coincidentally, for the weighted 
average real exchange rate, Rt and Λt are nearly 
uncorrelated. We can see in this case that the 
level  risk  premium  accounts  for  a  very  large 
share of the variance of qt (approximately 94.6 
percent.)
The overall conclusion is that while there is 
a fairly robust negative correlation between the 
long run real interest rate differential and the real 
value of the dollar, the correlation is strongest 
only when the long run real interest differen-
tial is highly positively correlated with the level 
risk premium. That is, in cases where the real 
exchange rate seems to vary strongly inversely 
with the long run real interest rate, we cannot 
separate out a real-interest rate effect from a risk 
premium effect. In all cases, as we have noted, 
there is a strong correlation between the level 
risk premium and the real exchange rate.
The real exchange rate is negatively correlated 
with Rt for four of the six currencies we report. 
When we estimate Rt for the French, German, 
and Italian currencies separately, we also find a 
negative correlation. This is an interesting find-
ing because it is supportive of the literature that 
links real exchange rates to real interest differ-
entials and is perhaps surprising in light of the 
empirical literature on uncovered interest parity.
The  literature  on  real  exchange  rates  from 
the 1970s and 1980s emphasized the role of real 
interest  differentials  in  driving  real  exchange 
rates. Jeffrey A. Frankel (1979) showed how an 
increase in a country’s short term real   interest 
Table 1—Estimated Standard Deviations and Correlations of qt, Rt and Λt
q R Λ q R Λ
Aggregate Eurozone
  q 13.36 −0.226 −0.975   q 15.85 −0.521 −0.986
  R 2.97 0.003   R 2.84 0.371
  Λ 13.01   Λ 14.57
Canada Japan
  q 11.25 −0.862 −0.966   q 19.13 0.153 −0.995
  R 4.08 0.702   R 2.00 −0.252
  Λ 8.01   Λ 19.53
Switzerland United Kingdom
  q 16.05 −0.302 −0.921   q 12.22 0.346 −0.919
  R 6.30 −0.094   R 6.63 −0.688
  Λ 15.37   Λ 15.80
Notes: Diagonal elements are standard deviations, off-diagonal elements are correlations. Expectations are calculated from 
VAR coefficients estimated 1979:10–2007:7. Correlations and standard deviations are based on estimates of Rt and Λt for 
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rate  should  lead  to  a  real  appreciation  of  the 
currency.  Frankel  provided  some  evidence  in 
support of his structural model by examining 
the behavior of the dollar/German mark rate. 
Charles Engel and Kenneth D. West (2006) and 
Nelson C. Mark (2009) are examples of recent 
empirical  studies  that  link  the  level  of  real 
exchange rates to the real interest differential.
But our findings might be surprising if one 
considers  the  well-known  uncovered  inter-
est parity puzzle and many of the attempts to 
account  for  the  finding  theoretically.  When 
expressed in real terms (using real interest rates 
and real exchange rates), the puzzling empiri-
cal finding is that  qt+1 − qt and   r  t   
 US   − rt
* are 
negatively correlated. Since, Et  qt+1 − qt should 
equal    r  t   
 US   − rt
*  under  risk-neutral  uncovered 
interest parity, the negative correlation implies 
that the risk premium, λt is negatively corre-
lated with the interest differential. One might 
be tempted to conclude (as some studies imply), 
that the risk premium can be described by:
(3)    λt  =  −γ(  r  t   
 US   − rt
*) + εt ,
where γ is a constant (γ > 1 allows a negative 
correlation between Et  qt+1 − qt and   r  t   
 US   − rt
*), 
and εt is a mean-zero random error uncorrelated 
with   r  t   
 US   − rt
*. If this were correct, then equa-
tion (1) could be expressed as
(4)    Et  qt+1 − qt  =  (1 − γ)(  r  t   
 US   − rt
*) + εt .
Solving this equation forward implies:
(5)    qt  =  (γ − 1)Rt − εt +  
__
  q     .
Equation  (5)  implies  a  positive  relationship 
between qt and Rt, but our estimates tend to find 
the opposite relationship.
In most cases, we find a relationship between 
real exchange rates and real interest rates that is 
consistent with some monetary models of real 
exchange rates but perhaps at odds with many 
risk  based  explanations  of  the  interest-parity 
puzzle. Engel (2010) explores this and related 
findings and their implications for models of the 
foreign exchange risk premium.
II.  The Crisis
We now turn to examination of the US real 
exchange rate during the global financial crisis 
and in its aftermath (July 2007–October 2009). 
We focus on trends that persisted for at least a 
few months. We acknowledge that even a few 
months may be too short a period to apply a 
model like ours; a negative correlation between 
q and R, for example, might not be manifest in 
short time periods. With that bit of caution, we 
plunge in.
Figure 1 plots fitted values for qt, Rt, and Λt 
for the aggregate of the six currencies. We omit 
the graphs for the other currencies in order to 
save  space.  Their  behavior  generally  mimics 
that of the six-currency aggregate.
2 First, we dis-
cuss the behavior of the real exchange rate itself. 
We refer to Figure 1 and identify three distinct 
sub-periods during the crisis.
July  2007–March  2008:  dollar  deprecia-
tion.—While  the  dollar  generally  depreciated 
in real terms from November 2005, there is a 
noticeable acceleration of the depreciation of the 
dollar  beginning  in  July  2007  through  March 
2008. Many commentators select July or August 
2007 as the commencement of the financial cri-
sis. In late July, Bear Stearns announced that two 
hedge funds with subprime exposure had little 
value. In August, markets were shaken up by 
BNP Paribas’s suspension of three funds invested 
in  subprime  mortgage  debt  and  Countrywide 
Financial’s (the largest mortgage lender in the 
United States) announcement of high levels of 
mortgage  delinquencies.  There  was  a  coordi-
nated injection of liquidity by the Fed, the ECB 
and the Bank of Japan on August 10th, and the 
Fed lowered the discount rate by 50 basis points 
on August 17th.
March 2008–March 2009: dollar apprecia-
tion.—The dollar appreciated during this period 
following the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 
2008, except for a brief sharp depreciation in 
December  2008  that  was  reversed  the  next 
month. The appreciation of the dollar, if any-
thing, accelerated through the crucial months of 
September and October 2008. (Recall Lehman 
Brothers  failed  on  September  15th,  and  the 
2 The real dollar/yen rate behaved differently than the 
aggregate real dollar rate in the critical period of September 
2008 to March 2009. The yen appreciated relative to the 
dollar  during  this  period,  while  the  dollar  appreciated 
against other currencies at that time.MAy 2010 566 AEA PAPERS ANd PROCEEdINGS
Federal Reserve began its extraordinary bailout 
of AIG on September 17th.)
March  2009–October  2009:  dollar  depre-
ciation.—The dollar depreciated in real terms 
during this period. This period coincides with 
the abatement of the worldwide crisis. Perhaps 
during this stage, the need for a “safe haven” in 
dollar assets had diminished.
It is difficult to tell a simple story tying the 
movements in the real exchange rate qt to the 
long run real interest rate, Rt. Recall from equa-
tion (2) that qt = −Rt − Λt +  
__
  q   , so the sum of 
the Rt and Λt is the negative of the real exchange 
rate  (up  to  a  constant  term.)  Figure  1  shows 
that the US real interest rate began increasing 
relative to its partners in October 2008, so that 
perhaps some of the real appreciation of the dol-
lar in late 2008 can be attributed to a real inter-
est rate effect. However, there are two reasons 
not to put too much weight on this observation. 
First, according to this measure, the relative real 
interest  rate  increase  continued  through  July 
2009, a period over which the dollar began to 
depreciate substantially. In fact, before October 
2008 there is not a close (negative) correspon-
dence between the real interest differential and 
the real exchange rate either. Second, our esti-
mates  of  this  real  interest  differential  during 
2008  are  sensitive  to  the  sample  period  over 
which the VAR is estimated. We tried estimat-
ing the VAR beginning in January 1984, since 
the change in monetary policy regime initiated 
in  1979  may  have  been  phased  in  gradually. 
When  the  parameters  are  estimated  over  this 
shorter sample, our Rt series shows a decline 
over all of 2008. Of course, over short samples 
the co-movements between qt and our estimate 
of Rt might not accurately reflect the true data 
generating process.
It is, however, possible to tell a story about 
the risk premium term Λt driving movements in 
the real exchange rate, one that involves finan-
cial  markets.  This  story  finds  occasional  cor-
roboration in the business press, as represented 
by Economist magazine; our quotes below are 
selective in that the Economist referenced the 
risk premium in a minority of its analyses of 
the US dollar. The real dollar depreciation from 
approximately late July 2007 until March 2008 
is reflected in a decline in Λt, or an increase in 
the risk premium on dollar assets: “confidence 
in the resilience of the US financial system has 
been shaken” (Economist 12/19/07). It is nota-
ble that the risk premium on the dollar increased 
during the early period of the crisis. It appears 
that the markets initially treated the crisis as an 
American problem that raised the riskiness of 
US assets. The dollar depreciated in real terms 
against all the currencies from July 2007 until 
March 2008, with the notable exception of the 
pound. During this time, the dollar did initially 
depreciate against the pound but subsequently 
began  to  appreciate  in  mid-September  2007. 
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That  coincides  with  the  collapse  of  Northern 
Rock, the United Kingdom’s fifth largest mort-
gage lender.
But  then,  remarkably,  the  dollar  began  to 
appreciate strongly in real terms between March 
2008 and March 2009. We offer two interpreta-
tions. One is that the US and UK financial crisis 
morphed into a global financial crisis with the 
failure of the major investment banks. The dol-
lar was now seen as a “safe haven” (Economist 
11/19/08), and so there was an increase in Λt. 
Alternatively, Λt does not represent a risk pre-
mium on foreign assets, but instead a liquidity 
premium: in fall 2008 “scared investors … were 
lured by the liquidity of the vast market for US 
Treasuries”  (Economist  6/11/09).  Financial 
institutions, in particular, were reluctant to sell 
any dollar denominated assets and were trying 
to shore up their balance sheets by acquiring 
safe dollar assets such as US Treasury securi-
ties. Interest-bearing securities denominated in 
other currencies were not considered to be as 
useful for this purpose, so their expected yield 
had to increase to sell on the market.
The  final  period  (March  2009  to  October 
2009) perhaps reflects a “revers[al of] the ear-
lier safe-haven flight into dollars” (Economist 
10/22/09). Investors may have begun to unwind 
their dollar positions that were amassed during 
the worst of the global crisis.
The real exchange rate is a useful indicator 
of  the  market’s  perception  of  relative  risk.  A 
case can be made that it conveys the message 
that the markets perceived the subprime crisis 
initially as a US crisis, and then a UK crisis. It 
was only in early 2008 that the markets began to 
perceive a global crisis, at which time the dol-
lar became a safe haven. As matters worsened 
in September 2008, the dollar assets continued 
to be considered safe. We believe, also, that the 
changes in the exchange rates over this period 
present a challenge for economic models of the 
exchange  rate.  It  is  apparent  that  the  models 
need to incorporate some measure of financial 
risks and liquidity in order to capture the broad 
movements of the exchange rate.
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